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SECTION 10(b) AND RULE lOb-5 FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW CLAIMS: THE NEED FOR THE
UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF THE ARBITRATION0 ISSUE
In the securities industry, pre-dispute arbitration clauses are stan-
dard features in investment contracts. Although the United States
Arbitration Act mandates the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments, many courts have refused to enforce investment contract
arbitration clauses fearing a lack of investor protection. This
Comment takes note of the Supreme Court's recent grant of review
in McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. and urges that,
given changes in structure, securities industry arbitration clauses
should be enforced as protecting investors while providing a more
efficient method of resolving securities disputes.
INTRODUCTION
An expanding "array of investment vehicles" has heightened
"public involvement in financial markets."'1 The resulting increase in
litigation between investors and members of the security industry
has produced a corresponding increase in the use of pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses.2 Although these clauses are standard features in in-
vestment contracts,3 many courts have refused to enforce them. In-
stead, arbitration often is stayed pending the litigation of the
investor's claim.
Arbitration is an alternative method of dispute resolution designed
to circumvent the costs, delays and frustrations of traditional litiga-
tion. The United States Arbitration Act of 1925 (Federal Act)4 was
designed to enforce private arbitration agreements, and evidences a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
The Second Uniform Arbitration Act (Uniform Act),5 passed in
1955, guarantees parties to arbitration various rights and affords ar-
1. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 279 (1984).
2. Id. at 279-80.
3. Note, Investor-Broker Arbitration Agreements: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 101, 108 (1985).
4. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982).
5. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985).
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bitrators various powers. Additionally, the Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion (Uniform Code),' developed by the securities industry, is
designed to promote impartiality of arbitral forums. Despite such ad-
vances, the applicability of arbitration to securities disputes is
fraught with uncertainty. This uncertainty arises from Wilko v.
Swan, 7 a 1953 United States Supreme Court decision.
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)8 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 9 to protect investors
against fraudulent practices and price manipulation. To further this
goal, the Supreme Court in Wilko refused to allow arbitration of
section 12(2) claims arising under the 1933 Act, and thereby created
an exception to the Federal Act. Subsequently, the issue arose
whether the Wilko doctrine of exclusive federal court jurisdiction in
securities actions applied to section 10(b) claims under the 1934
Act. The Supreme Court, while declining to resolve the issue, twice
has questioned the applicability of Wilko to section 10(b) actions. In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Corp.,0 the Court outlined patent differ-
ences between several provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The
1933 Act provides an express private right of action, while a private
action under the 1934 Act is implied. Additionally, the jurisdictional
provisions of the 1934 Act are more restrictive than those of the
1933 Act. These differences later were reiterated in Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.11
This Comment concludes that arbitration of section 10(b) actions
under the 1934 Act is appropriate. Moreover, in order to promote
both the securities law policy of protecting investors and the federal
policy of enforcing private arbitration agreements as evidenced by
the Federal Act, certain general arbitration procedures must be
modified for use in securities arbitration. Because securities laws ve-
hemently protect investors, arbitration must assure investors a com-
parable and adequate level of protection. This Comment argues that,
to protect investors, arbitration clauses must provide for greater dis-
covery. Additionally, opinions by arbitrators and records of arbitra-
tion proceedings are needed to assure arbitrator compliance with the
law. With such changes, arbitration can adequately protect investors
and can avoid the numerous problems associated with the litigation
process.
6. UNIF. CODE ARB., reprinted in Fourth Report of the Securities Industry Con-
ferences on Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 1984) (Ex-
hibit C).
7. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
8. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1982).
10. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
11. 470 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
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ARBITRATION AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
Arbitration Generally
Arbitration is the "reference of a dispute to one or more impartial
persons for final and binding determination. It is private and infor-
mal, designed for quick, practical and inexpensive settlements.
1 2
Arbitration is an "orderly proceeding, governed by rules of proce-
dure and standards of conduct prescribed by law."'13 The decisions
are binding - differing from mediation or conciliation - and pri-
vate, of interest only to the parties involved.14
Arbitration is not a new concept.15 Nevertheless, arbitration
agreements originally "were treated by the courts as unenforceable
attempts to 'oust' the courts from lawful jurisdiction.", Only re-
cently has enforcement of arbitration agreements and similar forum
selection clauses become routine.
17
Arbitration is designed to avoid the "formalities" of traditional lit-
igation - the cost, delay and frustration associated with trial.,8 The
parties have greater control over the hearing date, and thereby avoid
the loss of valuable time while awaiting trial. 9 Because of the confi-
dential nature of arbitration, greater disclosure may result.2 0 Addi-
tionally, the parties may select their own Arbitration Judge,21 often
an expert in the area of the dispute, which can save the time and
expense of educating a trial judge on the "technical intricacies of an
12. Comment, The Arbitration Alternative: Its Time Has Come, 46 MoNT. L.
REV. 199 (1985).
13. Id.
14. Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis
of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration As-
sociation and the Courts, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 6, 7 (1983) (quoting R. COULSON, BUSINESS
ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 6 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1980)).
15. Construction agreements as early as 1871 contained arbitration clauses. See
Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 14, at 7.
16. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the
Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 488 (1981).
17. Id. at 488 n.19.
18. Comment, supra note 12, at 200. The "real costs" of litigation may be more
than financial. Parties may suffer emotional costs as well. Id. at 199. Additionally, tradi-
tional litigation involves public costs to maintain the judiciary. Rayner, Arbitration: Pri-
vate Dispute Resolution as an Alternative to the Court, 22 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 33, 34
(1984).
19. Rayner, supra note 18, at 40. The hearing date usually is fixed upon consent
of the parties. Excessive informality, however, can impede fair resolution of the dispute.
Id.
20. This privacy, however, may not be in the public's best interest. Id. at 42.
21. Sterk, supra note 16, at 486.
industry. 22
Arbitration is more time and cost efficient than litigation. Many
litigated cases can take a week or longer to try, while an arbitration
hearing can be completed in two days. 23 Although the costs of arbi-
tration vary with the amount claimed, the hearing location, represen-
tation of counsel, and additional factors,24 a full arbitration hearing
generally costs less than a full adjudication in court.25 Arbitration,
therefore, simultaneously encourages efficient and speedy dispute
resolution, while relieving overcrowded court dockets. 28
The Uniform Code27 governs most arbitration proceedings in bro-
ker-investor disputes. The Uniform Code authorizes arbitrators to
subpoena witnesses and documents28 under the power of contempt.29
Additionally, arbitrators have discretion to hear and admit
evidence.30
In 1925 Congress enacted the Federal Act to counter judicial hos-
tility towards arbitration.31 The Federal Act established a "new pol-
22. Comment, supra note 12, at 206. Experts, however, may be biased. Rayner,
supra note 18, at 43.
23. Comment, supra note 12, at 207 ("The average hearing is scheduled for a
half day.").
24. Lipton, Arbitration in the Securities Industry: Too Much of a Good Thing?,
1985 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 151, 155.
25. Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 14, at 18-19.
26. Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 1137, 1142 (1986). Neither state nor federal courts "are capable of handling all
the burdens placed upon them." Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 277
(1982) (advocating arbitration).
27. UNIF. CODE ARB., reprinted in Fourth Report of the Securities Industry on
Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 1984) (Exhibit C).
28. Section 20(a) provides:
The arbitrator and any counsel of record to the proceedings shall have the
power of the subpoena process as provided by law. However, the parties shall
produce witnesses and present proofs to the fullest extent possible without re-
sort to the issuance of the subpoena process.
Id. § 20(a); see also Bayer & Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, 11 Lrlac. 30, 31
(1985) (experienced arbitration lawyers must utilize deposition subpoenas). However, the
witness "subpoenaed must be questioned at the arbitration hearing. This limitation in the
subpoena process severely undercuts the use of a subpoena as a pre-hearing disclosure
device." Willenken, The Often Overlooked Use of Discovery in Aid of Arbitration and
the Spread of the New York Rule to Federal Common Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 173, 182
(1979).
29. Parties usually agree on a procedure for reviewing subpoenaed documents
before the arbitration hearing to save time at the hearing. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 287
n.52.
30. See Note, supra note 3, at 113 n.62.
31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). "Arbitration agreements are purely matters of con-
tract, and the effect of the [Federal Act] is simply to make the contracting party live up
to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disad-
vantageous to him." Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
985 (2d Cir. 1942) (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)). The Fed-
eral Act was designed to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other
contracts." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Corp., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)).
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icy, declaring the validity, irrevocability and enforceability" of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.3 2 Designed to enforce private arbi-
tration agreements, the Federal Act mandates that federal courts ei-
ther stay court proceedings pending arbitration" or compel arbitra-
tion when a party refuses, fails, or neglects to arbitrate under a valid
written agreement.34 Thus, the court may only determine whether a
valid written agreement exists which governs the claim.3 5 In mandat-
ing the enforcement of arbitration agreements, Congress expressed a
national policy favoring arbitration; to promote this policy, Congress
has precluded states from requiring judicial resolution of disputes.36
The first modern state statute enforcing pre-dispute arbitration
agreements was enacted in 1920.a' Presently, forty-five states have
enacted statutes enforcing such agreements.3 Most state statutes are
patterned after the Uniform Act, promulgated in 1955.11 Under the
Uniform Act, parties may present material evidence, cross-examine
witnesses, and be represented by counsel at the arbitration hearing.40
32. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); Note, Mixed Arbitrable and NonArbitrable Claims in
Securities Litigation: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 525, 530
(1985). The Act provides that a "written provision in. . .a contract evidencing a trans-
action thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982):
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court . . . upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitra-
tion has been had ....
34. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). This section requires the court to decide the arbitrability
of a claim and "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." Id.
35. Note, supra note 32, at 530-31. To prevail on a motion to compel arbitration,
a party must establish: (1) the existence of an agreement to arbitrate; (2) the existence
of an arbitrable claim; and (3) that no party waived that right to arbitrate. Bob Ladd,
Inc. v. Adcock, 633 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (citing McMahon v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
36. Comment, supra note 20, at 203 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984)). In Southland Corp., the Supreme Court held that section 2 of the Act was
substantive federal law. 465 U.S. at 12.
37. Note, supra note 34, at 1141. New York was the first state to enact a statute.
38. Id. Only Alabama, Nebraska, North Dakota, Virginia and West Virginia en-
force agreements to arbitrate existing disputes but not future disputes. See ALA. CODE 6-
6-1 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. 25-2103 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE 32-29-01 (Supp. 1985);
VA. CODE 9.01-577 (1984); W. VA. CODE 55-10-1 (1981).
39. UNIE. ARBITRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985).
40. Comment, supra note 12, at 200.
An arbitrator has the same authority to subpoena witnesses and doc-
uments,41 under the contempt power,4 2 as provided for by the Uni-
form Code. 3
The Uniform Act is similar to the Federal Act. Under both Acts,
written agreements to arbitrate future disputes are irrevocable and
enforceable." Courts may choose to compel arbitration or stay state
court proceedings pending arbitration. 5 The strong federal policy
favoring arbitration is evidenced in both Acts. Nevertheless, arbitra-
tion of securities claims often has not enjoyed the same strong fed-
eral support as has arbitration generally.
Securities Industry Arbitration
The stock market crash of 1929 prompted federal regulation of
securities. The 1933 Act" promotes disclosure in securities offerings
to protect investors from fraudulent practices.47 The 1934 Act 8 at-
tempts to protect investors against stock price manipulation.49 To-
gether, the Acts require complete disclosure of relevant information
in registration statements filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 50 Both Acts are designed to promote a "high
standard of business ethics" 51 in the securities industry and require
flexible interpretation to achieve their remedial purposes.5 2
In recent years, the use of arbitration to resolve investor-broker
disputes has increased dramatically. 3 This increase is caused by the
extensive use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in investment con-
tracts. As a condition to opening an account, broker-dealers (bro-
kers) frequently request or require investor-customers (investors) to
agree to arbitrate any future disputes concerning the management of
the account."4 These pre-dispute arbitration clauses are standard fea-
tures in pre-printed margin, option, and cash account agreements. 55
41. Id. at 200-01.
42. Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 28, at 31.
43. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
44. Note, supra note 26, at 1141 n.33. The first Uniform Act, adopted in 1925,
applied only to agreements to arbitrate existing disputes. Id. at 1140.
45. Id. at 1141 n.33.
46. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982).
47. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
49. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195.
50. Note, supra note 32, at 531-32 n.44.
51. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933)).
52. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 195.
53. See Lipton, supra note 24, at 154. The number of disputes themselves has
increased as a result of increased public involvement in the securities markets. See supra
text accompanying notes 1-2.
54. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 102.
55. Id. at 103. Moreover, these clauses often may create adhesion contracts. Kat-
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They generally are broad, encompassing "any controversy. ' 56 The
clauses mandate that arbitration proceedings be conducted according
to the rules of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) 57 listed in the
clause and selected by the investor. 58 Frequently, neither the broker
nor the investor discusses arbitration when entering into the invest-
ment agreement, and the clauses become buried in "pages of small
print."
59
The securities industry favors arbitration as a dispute resolution
method60 for several reasons. Brokers dislike the delay and costs of
federal litigation, especially when the amount in controversy is small.
Jury awards frequently are more generous than arbitration awards,
and punitive damages, generally not awarded in arbitration, may be
granted in litigation.61
Securities industry arbitration forums are administered by various
SROs. Before 1976 most SROs had different rules for resolving in-
vestor disputes. In June 1976 the SEC recommended developing a
uniform system of arbitration procedures for use by the organiza-
tions offering arbitration facilities. 62 Accordingly, various SROs or-
soris, supra note 1, at 306-09.
56. Note, supra note 3, at 102. A typical clause reads as follows:
Any controversy arising out of or relating to the account of the undersigned, to
transactions with you for the undersigned or to this Agreement or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in
effect of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of
Governors of the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange
as the undersigned may elect. If the undersigned does not make such election
by registered mail addressed to you at your main office within five days after
demand by you that the undersigned make such election, then you may make
such election. Judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrators may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Note, supra note 32, at 552 n.187.
57. The SROs are the American, Boston, Cincinnati, Midwest, New York, Pa-
cific and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the Mu-
nicipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the New York Stock Ex-
change handle most arbitrations. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 280 n.7.
58. See Exchange Act Release No. 15,984 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 82,122 (July 2, 1979). A typical clause authorizes the investor to elect the
arbitration forum from a list of several SROs. Failure by the investor to elect the forum
within five days after broker notification requesting the election automatically authorizes
the broker to make the election. Id. 81,977 n.4. See supra note 56.
59. Note, supra note 3, at 118.
60. Peloso, Agreements to Arbitrate, 13 REv. SEc. REG. 943, 950 (1980).
61. See Note, supra note 32, at 551.
62. Id. at 548. After soliciting comments from interested parties and conducting
public hearings, the SEC also recommended that all brokerage firms with public inves-
tors establish in-house complaint processing systems. Id.
ganized the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), 8
which developed the Uniform Code. 4
The Uniform Code is designed to promote the impartiality of arbi-
tral forums.65 Originally, in disputes involving amounts greater than
$2500, the arbitration panels consisted of no less than three nor
more than five arbitrators. The majority of panel members could not
come from the securities industry unless the investors requested oth-
erwise. 6 Recently, due to the increased number of disputes and
amounts in controversy, several SROs have amended their rules to
allow for a more flexible method of appointing panel members.6 7 Ad-
ditionally, parties may exclude arbitrators with or without cause.6 8
As the use of arbitration forums in securities disputes grew, the
SEC expressed concern over the widespread and unrestricted use of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses to compel arbitration.6 The concern
stemmed from the belief that most investors were unaware that they
had a right to a judicial forum for securities claims.70 In 1979 the
SEC concluded that a broker's failure to bring the pre-dispute arbi-
tration clause to the investor's attention may be fraudulent.7 1 The
63. This Conference was composed of 10 SROs (the American, Boston, Cincin-
nati, Midwest, New York, Pacific and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers, Inc.), the Securities Industry Association (a trade association
for the industry), and three representatives of the general public. Id. at 548 n.155.
64. See supra note 27. The SEC approved the Code in 1979. Note, supra note 32,
at 548.
65. To accomplish this, the Code incorporates several provisions not included in
previous arbitral systems. Note, supra note 32, at 548.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 23,179 (April 28, 1986). The American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) now has discretion to appoint a panel of three or five arbitra-
tors in cases involving amounts less than $500,000. Before this approved rule change,
AMEX rules provided for a panel of three to five arbitrators in disputes involving
amounts less than $100,000 and a panel of five arbitrators in disputes involving amounts
over $100,000. When the amount in controversy exceeds $500,000 the panel shall consist
of five arbitrators.
68. Note, supra note 32, at 549. A party has a right to one peremptory challenge
without providing a reason. For a concise description of the Code provisions, see Katsoris,
supra note 1, at 285-86.
69. Agreements to submit existing disputes must be distinguished from agree-
ments to submit future disputes. Under present law, investors may agree to submit ex-
isting disputes for arbitration. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 292. The primary rationale for
voiding pre-dispute arbitration agreements is that deprivation of forum or recovery
choice does not apply to agreements to arbitrate existing disputes because, in the latter,
an investor knows his claim and can intelligently evaluate available forums and recovery
methods before agreeing to arbitration. Note, supra note 3, at 102; see also Katsoris,
supra note 1, at 294-95.
70. Note, supra note 32, at 549. This concern arose from the SEC's belief that
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), had secured investors' right to a judicial forum.
See infra note 77.
71. Peloso, supra note 60, at 950. See Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 15,984
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,122 (July 2, 1979). The Release
suggests that the unfairness to the investor lay in the use of pre-printed forms without
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negative industry reaction to this SEC opinion and the continued use
of the clauses without disclosure prompted the SEC to enact rule
15c2-2.
72
The substance of rule 15c2-2 is twofold. First, the rule prohibits
brokers from entering into agreements purportedly binding investors
to arbitration.73 Second, the rule requires brokers to send disclosure
statements to investors who entered into such agreements prior to
the rule's effective date of December 28, 1983. Under rule 15c2-2,
these statements must inform investors that brokers cannot compel
arbitration of federal securities law claims.7 4 However, in enacting
the rule, the SEC merely assumed the validity of the decisional law
upon which it based this rule. 8 It is this assumption which requires
close scrutiny.
The Wilko Doctrine: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
Section 14 of the 1933 Act voids any "condition, stipulation or
provision" requiring an investor "to waive compliance with any pro-
vision of this sub-chapter," any SEC rule, or regulation. 6 In the
1953 decision of Wilko v. Swan,7 7 the Supreme Court defined the
effect of the section 14 antiwaiver provision on pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements.
In Wilko, an investor alleged broker misrepresentation in violation
of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.7 8 The brokerage firm moved for
arbitration under a pre-dispute arbitration clause in the parties' in-
vestment contract. The district court held that arbitration denied the
investor the "advantageous court remedy afforded" by the 1933
Act.79 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and held that
the 1933 Act did not prohibit a prior agreement to refer disputes to
arbitration.80
disclosure. Hence, disclosure may remedy the SEC's concern. Peloso, supra note 60, at
950.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1985).
73. See id.
74. See id. This disclosure requirement is based upon the SEC's understanding of
Wilko, 346 U.S. 427. See infra note 77. The rule, however, is "procedural, providing
only for notice to the customer, and [it] does not act substantively to prevent arbitration
of all federal [securities] claims." Steinberg v. Illinois Co., 635 F. Supp. 615, 617 (E.D.
Ill. 1986) (citing Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 527 (D. Md. 1986)).
75. Peloso, supra note 60, at 950.
76. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
77. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
78. Id.
79. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
80. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 12(2) claims
were not arbitrable. The Court reasoned that, to protect investors
from fraud, "[section] 12(2) created a special right to recover for
misrepresentation which differs substantially from the common-law
action." '81 For misrepresentation claims at common law, proof of sci-
enter, the "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud," '82 was the
plaintiff's burden. Under section 12(2), however, the broker has the
burden of proving lack of scienter. Hence, section 12(2) in effect
imposes liability without a showing of scienter - a plaintiff need
only prove "a negligent misstatement or omission. '83
The Court also stated that the arbitration agreement in Wilko was
contrary to section 22(a) of the 1933 Act.8' Section 22(a) provides
that an aggrieved party may bring suit "in any court of competent
jurisdiction - federal or state - and removal from a state court is
prohibited." 85 Under the antiwaiver provision (section 14) of the
1933 Act, investors may not waive compliance with the expansive
forum selection provided by section 22(a). The Court ruled that the
arbitration agreement in Wilko violated section 14 because the
agreement amounted to a stipulation binding the investor to waive
compliance with section 22(a). 86 Essentially, the agreement pre-
cluded the investor from bringing his claim before a court.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the three sections of the
1933 Act - section 12(2), the antifraud provision; section 14, the
antiwaiver provision; and section 22(a), the forum selection provision
- interfaced to justify the invalidation of the arbitration agree-
ment.817 The Court was confronted with competing policies: investor
protection under the securities laws and enforcement of private arbi-
tration agreements under the Federal Act. The Court determined
that, in enacting the 1933 Act, Congress "created an exception to
the federal mandate" of arbitration and the "intention of Congress
concerning the sale of securities under the 1933 Act was best effec-
tuated by holding the arbitration agreement invalid."8 8 The Wilko
exception to the Federal Act, however, does not apply to disputes
between members of a national securities exchange ("member-to-
81. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
82. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
83. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1398n.14 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Berger v. Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d 302, 308 (8th Cir.
1982)).
84. Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
85. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35. Additionally, section 22(a) provides for national
service of process. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 294.
86. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
87. See Bob Ladd, Inc. v. Adcock, 633 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ark. 1986).88. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; see also Katsoris, supra note 1, at 294 (the three
provisions "implicitly repealed" the Federal Act with regard to the 1933 Act securities
claims).
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member controversies") 89 or to disputes which involve only "knowl-
edgeable" persons, that is, sophisticated investors and brokers who
deal at arm's length."0 The exception applies only to ordinary inves-
tor-broker disputes.
Wilko as Applied to the 1934 Act
After the Wilko decision, the issue arose as to whether the invalid-
ity of the pre-dispute arbitration provisions also would apply to sec-
tion 10(b) disputes under the 1934 Act. Section 10(b) provides in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of" SEC rules and regulations.' This section and SEC rule 10b-592
promulgated thereunder are "catchall" antifraud provisions.'
3
Many courts expanded the Wilko doctrine to invalidate pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements in claims alleging section 10(b) viola-
tions.94 These courts relied on the similarity of the antiwaiver provi-
sions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,95 rejecting the Supreme Court's
subsequent suggestions that Wilko should not be expanded to the
1934 Act.
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Corp.,'6 the Supreme Court outlined
a "colorable argument" that Wilko does not apply to section 10(b)
actions, drawing distinctions between the provisions of the two
Acts.' 7 Unlike section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, which provides an ex-
press private right of action, actions based upon section 10(b) and
rule 1Ob-5 merely are implied. The Court noted that no "statutory
counterpart" to section 12(2) exists in the 1934 Act, and neither sec-
tion 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 "speaks of a private remedy to redress
violations."' 8
89. Peloso, supra note 60, at 947.
90. Id.
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
93. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
94. See, e.g., Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mo-
ran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1968). This
Comment focuses only upon the applicability of Wilko to section 10(b) actions and does
not address Wilko's applicability to additional violations of the 1934 Act.
95. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 300. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)(1982) with 15
U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
96. 417 U.S. 506 (1974), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
97. Id. at 514.
98. Id. at 513.
Additionally the 1934 Act does not establish the "special right" to
recover for misrepresentations without proving scienter.99 Unlike sec-
tion 12(2) of the 1933 Act, proof of scienter is an "indispensable
ingredient" in successful section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 actions.100
Furthermore, while the Acts contain similar antiwaiver provisions,101
certain provisions of the 1933 Act that the Wilko Court found could
not be waived by an arbitration agreement "find no counterpart" in
the 1934 Act. Specifically, the Court focused on the jurisdictional
provisions of the 1933 Act.102 Under section 22(a) of the 1933
Act,103 an action could be brought in "any court of competent juris-
diction - federal or state - and removal from state court was pro-
hibited. 10 4 The 1934 Act provides for action only in the federal dis-
trict courts having "exclusive jurisdiction,"10 5 thus "significantly
restricting Plaintiff's choice of forum."106 The 1934 Act does not
provide for the expansive forum selection of the 1933 Act. Hence,
the forum selection provision so jealously guarded by the Wilco
Court does not exist in the 1934 Act. Nevertheless, a few courts
have suggested that Scherk "merely carves out a narrow exception
to the Wilko holding" and applies "only to international
transactions.
o10 7
99. Id. at 514.
100. Berger v. Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d 302, 309 (8th Cir. 1982). The degree of
proof in such actions is preponderance of the evidence. Comment, Securities Fraud: A
Supreme Court Prospectus of the 10(b) Action, 29 Loy. L. REV. 1101, 1110 (1983). The
Supreme Court in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), rejected
the clear and convincing standard, noting that modern commodities dealings had little to
do with common-law fraud actions requiring the clear and convincing standard. Because
the preponderance of evidence standard is sufficient to establish liability in civil suits for
money damages, in SEC actions to establish fraud under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
in administrative proceedings before the SEC, and by district courts in section 10(b)
actions, this standard is appropriate for modern securities suits. Id. To succeed in such
actions, the investor must establish: (1) that the broker acted in violation of the section
or rule (A broker violates the provisions if he employs a device, scheme or artifice to
defraud, makes misrepresentations or omissions of material facts, or engages in acts,
practices or conduct of business that operates as fraud or deceit. Harris v. Union Elec,
Co., 787 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir. 1986)); (2) causation (Causation, the "single most
predominate factor running through" section 10(b) and rule lob-5 claims, is either
"transaction" causation, relating to the actual purchase or sale of securities, or "loss"
causation, relating to the cause of the loss. Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule
lOb-5, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 99 (1981). The key elements of transaction causation are reli-
ance, materiality and due diligence. Id. at 111-20. Loss causation involves manipulation,
insider trading or misrepresentation or omissions. Id. at 121-30.); (3) damages; and (4)
that the fraudulent activity occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties." Harris, 787 F.2d at 362.
101. See supra note 95.
102. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
103. Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982).
104. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
105. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
106. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514. For a concise discussion of the differences between
the two Acts, see Katsoris, supra note 1.
107. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 299 n.143. Courts rejecting the Scherk Court's
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The distinctions noted by the Scherk Court were reiterated by
Justice White in his concurring opinion in Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd.108 Justice White noted the absence of the "special
right" and express remedy in the 1934 Act,
109 as well as the nar-
rower jurisdictional provisions. He warned against "mechanically
transplant[ing]" Wilko's reasoning to the 1934 Act,
110 concluding
that the issue of arbitrability of section 10(b) actions remains
"open.""' Moreover, "in interpreting an implied cause of action...
a finding of Congressional intent to create an exception to the [Fed-
"colorable argument" include Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,
1030 (6th Cir. 1979); Weissbach v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558
F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Ayers v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976) (because the
antiwaiver provisions of the Acts are nearly identical and under Wilko the 1933 Act
provision prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements as equalling a waiver, the 1934
Act provision also prohibits such agreements). Additionally, the Ayers court noted the
apparent acceptance by Congress that Wilko applies to section 10(b) claims. Ayers, 538
F.2d at 537 (citing H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 321, 342).
108. 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J., concurring). In addition to federal se-
curities law claims, investors often allege state and common-law violations. State claims
commonly involve breaches of contract or fiduciary duties. Common-law claims often are
claims of fraud. Note, supra note 32, at 541. Faced with the issue whether these pendent
state claims could be arbitrated, the Supreme Court in Byrd, espousing the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration, held that, when federal securities and state law claims arising
out of the same facts are joined and a valid arbitration agreement exists, the state claims
must be arbitrated. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217; see also Brodsky, Arbitration in Securities
Cases, N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1986, at 1, col. 1. The Supreme Court rejected both the "inter-
twining" doctrine and the "bifurcated approach" utilized by lower courts to decide the
issue. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 222. The "intertwining" doctrine mandated that courts deny
arbitration of all claims, federal and state, under the arbitration prohibition of Wilko,
and preserve federal jurisdiction when the claims were so intertwined as to make sever-
ability difficult or impossible. Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976)
The Sibley court, however, determined that the case facts were not so intertwined to
prevent separation. Id. at 543-44.
Under the "bifurcation" approach, state claims are stayed pending judicial resolution
of the federal claims. Dickinson v. Heinold Sec. Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether section 10(b) and rule lob-5
securities claims could be arbitrated, determining that the issue was not properly before
the Court. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215-16 n.l.
109. See Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (White, J., concurring) (Wilko's "solicitude for
the federal cause of action is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action is
judicially implied").
110. Id. at 224.
111. Id. at 225; see also Bob Ladd, Inc. v. Adcock, 633 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ark.
1986). Bob Ladd noted that courts applying the Wilko doctrine to claims under the 1934
Act do so in a rather "'mechanical fashion' with little regard for the specific claim being
set forth" and those courts which have declined to apply Wilko recognize the differences
between the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id. at 243.
eral] Act may not be warranted" 112 as was found in Wilko.lla In
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,114 de-
cided shortly after Byrd, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the importance of a statutory scheme, as determined by a court,
could outweigh the important policy of the Federal Act to enforce
private contractual arbitration agreements.1IC
Espousing Justice White's concurring opinion, several recent court
decisions have held section 10(b) actions to be arbitrable.116 Some
courts, however, continue to apply Wilko to securities claims, point-
ing to a variety of justifications for doing so. In Conover v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.,1' 7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the three reasons favoring nonarbitrability of section
12(2) claims apply "with equal force" to section 10(b) actions: (1)investors are subject to overbearing brokers; (2) judicial discretion is
required to ensure full protection of the Acts; and (3) because the
Acts provide special protections to investors, investors surrender
more by agreeing to submit claims to arbitration than individuals
who agree to submit routine business transaction claims to
arbitration.118
BALANCING COMPETING POLICIES
In the securities industry, the strong federal policy favoring arbi-
tration purportedly conflicts with the investor protection policy of the
112. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197,1204 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at513-14); see also Katsoris, supra note 1, at 300-01 ("It is illogical to insist that thegeneral nonwaiver provision of the Exchange Act overrides the [Federal] Act in the samemanner as section 14 of the Securities Act, when the Exchange Act's nonwaiver provisionis not buttressed by special rights and broad jurisdictional provisions similar to those
found in the Securities Act.").
113. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
114. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Phillips, 795 F.2d 1393; Schriner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 635 F.Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Bob Ladd, Inc. v. Adcock, 633 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ark.1986). Term Resources I v. Burgin, [1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 192,703 (S.D.N.Y. April 1, 1986). Contra Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 19865) (petition for certiorari filed August 29, 1986); McMahon v.Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60(1986); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 634 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
117. 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
118. Id. at 525 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-33, 435-37).
Additionally, a loss of substantive rights is feared if section 10(b) actions are arbi-trated. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Scherk, expressed concern that (a)subjective findings of knowledge and purpose will be ill-determined by arbitrators with-out judicial instruction on the law; (b) arbitration awards are made without an explana-tion of reasons or a record, making the arbitrator's conception of the statutory scheme
unreviewable; (c) extensive pre-trial discovery is not available; and (d) the wide venuechoice provided by the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982), would be lost. 417 U.S. at
532 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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securities laws. However, nothing indigenous to the securities laws
makes arbitration inappropriate.119 Arguably, buyers and sellers of
securities occupy unequal bargaining positions. The Supreme Court
emphasized this potential inequality when invalidating the Wilko in-
vestment contract arbitration clause. This unequal bargaining posi-
tion argument used to invalidate investment contract arbitration
clauses applies with equal persuasiveness to areas outside the securi-
ties industry.120 Investment contracts are a type of commercial con-
tract, and many commercial contracts are executed by parties in un-
equal bargaining positions. Though these contracts often contain
standard pre-printed arbitration clauses121 similar to those contained
in investment contracts, the commercial contract arbitration clauses
are not void because of the existing inequality. If courts could invali-
date arbitration clauses in investment contracts because of the bar-
gaining inequality, courts could invalidate arbitration clauses in all
commercial contracts in which the bargaining power between the
parties was unequal. This potentially unlimited invalidation would
undermine the strong federal policy favoring arbitration by practi-
cally eliminating arbitration clauses and hence the availability of ar-
bitration to parties who desire a more efficient resolution of disputes
but who happen to occupy unequal bargaining positions. Both the
federal policy favoring arbitration and the securities law investor
protection policy can be achieved by means less devastating to
arbitration.
Increased Judicial Review
A perceived lack of judicial involvement in arbitration awards has
fostered fears that arbitration does not adequately protect investors.
Judicial involvement in arbitration, however, is limited, but not lack-
ing.1 22 Judicial review is restricted by federal and state statutes to
motions to vacate, modify, or resubmit an award.12 3 An award may
119. Sterk, supra note 16, at 520.
120. Id. at 517.
121. Id. at 518. Moreover, because the securities laws were designed to protect
investors and restore public confidence in the securities market, the laws succeed by ad-
justing the legal rights of the parties to better work justice between them, and "public
policy furnishes no reason to refuse enforcement of arbitration clauses" in securities in-
vestment contracts. Id. at 519.
122. Judicial enforcement of an award consists of entering judgment on the award.
Widiss, Judicial Enforcement and Review of Arbitration Awards, 14 BRIEF 37 (1985).
This procedure essentially is automatic when the noncomplying party to an award does
not object to the requested enforcement. Id. at 38.
123. Both the Federal Act and the Uniform Act provide limited grounds for vacat-
be challenged only upon statutorily specified grounds. 124
In practice, courts are reluctant to interfere in an arbitrator's deci-
sion. 25 Judicial review may be permitted for "manifest disregard" of
the law. 2 ' And, when the parties provide in the agreement to arbi-
trate the dispute pursuant to specified law, or when an arbitrator
declares that his determination was made pursuant to law which he
specified, the application of that law may be reviewed by a court. 27
A growing trend in recent years favors more extensive judicial re-
view of arbitration awards. Courts are no longer as reluctant as in
the past to apply available statutory standards to review the merits
of an arbitrator's decision. 28 With increased frequency, judges are
vacating awards on public policy grounds'29 and concluding that ar-
bitrators exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement. 130 This
trend is no doubt welcomed by those who fear that arbitration does
not offer adequate protection.
The increased use of judicial review furthers investor protection
while preserving the benefits of invoking the arbitration process. In-
ing an award. An award will be vacated if the award was procured by corruption, fraudor undue means, if one or more arbitrators was evidently partial or corrupt, if one or
more of the arbitrators was guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing orhear pertinent or material evidence, or if any other misconduct by which the rights ofany party were prejudiced, or if one or more arbitrators exceeded their powers or soimperfectly executed them that a mutual final and definitive award was not made. 9
U.S.C. § 10 (1982); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 20 (1985); see Comment, supranote 12, at 214. The statutes allow for modification or correction of an award if (1) anevident or material miscalculation or mistake occurred; (2) the award was made upon a
matter not submitted or properly before the arbitrators; or (3) the award was imperfectin matters of form not affecting the merits of the dispute. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982); UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 13 (1985); see Comment, supra note 12, at 214 n.129.
124. Comment, supra note 12, at 214 n.130; San Martine Compania de Navega-
cion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
125. An award will not be opened unless "perverse misconstruction or positive mis-
conduct" by an arbitrator is "plainly established" or the arbitration agreement providedotherwise. M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 34:00(Wilner rev. ed. 1984). "If the award is within the submission and contains the honest
decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equitywill not set it aside for error, either in law or fact." Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 344, 349 (1854). Finality of the arbitration award is one of the principal advan-tages of arbitration. If awards were subject to judicial review for error, the arbitration
process would be "neither speedy nor inexpensive." Sterk, supra note 24, at 482 n.6.
126. See M. DOMKE, supra note 125, § 25:05, at 396. Arbitrators "may not disre-gard the law." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 336, 340 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Any disregard
would "constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10" of the Federal
Act. Id. (citing lower court opinion). Such disregard rarely occurs in practice. M.
Domi<E, supra note 125, § 25:05, at 396.
127. M. DOMKE, supra note 125, § 25:05, at 396.
128. Widiss, supra note 122, at 39.
129. See generally id. at 38, 40.
130. Id. at 39. An arbitrator may not decide issues not expressly included in the
arbitration agreement. Id. at 40-41. An agreement, however, to "arbitrate all disputesbetween us" usually will give an arbitrator general jurisdiction. Bayer & Abrahams,
supra note 28, at 32.
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vestors are given a greater assurance that courts will step in to pro-
tect them if arbitrators disregard the law. Parties to arbitration also
are guaranteed the right to appeal a decision and may not waive this
right."3' The wholesale contractual elimination of court control over
the arbitration process acts to invalidate an arbitration agreement. 3 2
Despite the increased frequency of judicial review, the advantages
of the arbitration process are preserved because judicial review re-
mains heavily restricted by statute.13 3 If review were to become less
restricted, the arbitration process would lose several of its principal
advantages. Routine review would make the process slow and ineffi-
cient, much the same as litigation. The frustrations and delays char-
acteristic of litigation (caused by customary and frequent review of
decisions) would be unfortunately injected into the arbitration
process.
The current level of judicial review of arbitration awards is an
acceptable balance of court involvement in and absence from the ar-
bitration process. Investors are protected by the increased willingness
of courts to review arbitration decisions when investors' rights ap-
pear to have been disregarded, but the arbitration process retains its
advantages over traditional litigation because such judicial review re-
mains limited by statute. While the current level of judicial review
should be maintained, the discovery process in arbitration must be
reformed to better protect investors.
Increased Discovery
To assure fair and full adjudication of claims by knowing and con-
sidering all relevant facts, adequate discovery is imperative: the in-
vestment contract arbitration clause must provide for adequate dis-
covery. The greater the arbitral forum's "ability to adjudicate
securities claims fully and fairly, the less forceful is the proposition
that arbitration is a 'waiver of compliance' with the securities
laws.' 3 4 Currently, discovery in arbitration is limited in order to cir-
cumvent the costs, delay, and complexity of traditional litigation.1
3 5
The extent of discovery is usually the voluntary disclosure of docu-
ments and other evidence. 1 6 Arbitrators, however, are authorized to
131. M. DOMKE, supra note 125, § 33:01, at 464.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134. Peloso, supra note 60, at 950.
135. Willenken, supra note 28, at 182.
136. See Katsoris, supra note 1, at 285-89.
subpoena documents and witnesses under the contempt power.137
The typical pre-dispute arbitration clause13 8 does not provide specifi-
cally for discovery. A few courts, however, have granted pre-arbitra-
tion hearing discovery when the arbitrator determines it to be appro-
priate, 3 9 although this power "has been used sparingly and only in
extreme circumstances. 1 40
The arbitration clause must provide for "all applicable discov-
ery. '1 41 Even to "boilerplate" arbitration provisions, discovery provi-
sions should be added and insisted upon by the parties.1 42 A typical
investor who signs a pre-printed investment contract containing a
standard arbitration clause often is unaware of the importance of or
the need to ensure for adequate discovery. Investors may not even
know that the contract contains an arbitration clause143 or what pro-
tection arbitration will provide. The burden of providing for ade-
quate discovery, therefore, should fall on the brokers by drafting dis-
covery provisions into the arbitration clauses. Brokers may contend
that the responsibility of protecting investors lies with the investors
themselves. Adequate discovery, however, serves the dual purpose of
protecting both investors and brokers by assuring that all facts nec-
essary for a fair arbitral decision are "discovered" and considered by
the arbitrator.
Because providing for "all applicable discovery" ultimately may
lead to the extensive, burdensome and time-consuming discovery
process associated with litigation, 44 discovery in arbitration must be
confined pursuant to agreed-upon limitations. The Federal Rules of
Civil. Procedure provide an example of workable limitations on the
amount and type of discovery allowed, and these limits could be
adapted to fit the contours of arbitration.145 Additionally, as one
commentator has noted, "it would be helpful" if SROs who conduct
the arbitration proceedings provided "optional rules for discovery
137. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 56.
139. Willenken, supra note 28, at 175-76.
140. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 287-88 n.52.
141. Schern, Discovery and Case Preparation, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 2,
col. 5.
142. Id. at 5, col. 2.
143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
144. Extensive pre-trial discovery practiced by courts can be "unnecessarily expen-
sive and burdensome," Katsoris, supra note 1, at 287 n.52, resulting in "protracted"
litigation. Willenken, supra note 28, at 181.
145. Willenken, supra note 28, at 186. Examples of discovery limits which could
be provided for include: (1) discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
excluding the taking of depositions of independent witnesses; (2) deposing of the two
most knowledgeable persons who are officers, agents or employees of each party; (3)
disposing of all related documentation; (4) permitting interrogatories to each party; or
(5) procuring affidavits from each witness and a copy of each document that is expected
to be used at the hearing. Id.
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which could be included" in investment contracts.
146
The investment contract is an "appropriate and proper place to
provide for discovery in advance of arbitration. 147 Adequate discov-
ery pursued within established limits will protect investors and bro-
kers alike. Limited discovery will ensure the fair adjudication of se-
curities claims to the benefit of all parties, while reducing the
burdens of traditional discovery. This, in turn, will help preserve the
efficient character of the arbitration process. Adequate discovery,
however, will not protect investors against an arbitrator's failure to
comply with the securities laws. To achieve maximum protection, a
record of an arbitration proceeding must be maintained, and an
opinion must be rendered.
Requirement of a Record or Opinion
In practice, arbitrators are not required to write an opinion or
state the reasons for an award.148 Records of arbitration proceedings
are not required unless requested by the arbitrator or a party.149
Despite widespread belief that arbitrators maintain no record or
opinion of securities arbitration proceedings, some sort of record is
kept by most SROs hearing such disputes.1 50 Most, however, must
be expanded to "all" to fully protect investors. Justice Frankfurter,
in his dissenting opinion in Wilko, called for the maintenance of
"some" record or opinion, "however informal. 1 51 Requiring a rela-
tively thorough, yet concise, record or opinion will protect both in-
vestors and the arbitration process.
A record or opinion also would help courts determine whether an
arbitrator's decision should be reviewed, modified or vacated. The
records or opinions would display arbitrator compliance or noncom-
pliance with the law:15 2 lack of compliance will "upset" an award.1 5 3
The records and opinions, therefore, arm investors who question the
propriety of an award with the artillery necessary to successfully ob-
tain judicial review.
146. Id. at 186.
147. Id. at 185.
148. E.g., M. DOMKE, supra note 125, § 29:06, at 435-36; UNIF. CODE ARB. § 25;
see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203-04 n.4 (1956).
149. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 286 n.47 (emphasis added).
150. Id. If a party asks to have the record transcribed, he bears the costs. Id. But
see Note, supra note 3, at 113 n.63.
151. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. In the record or opinion, arbitrator compliance with the law "will appear, or
want of it will upset the award." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440.
On the other hand, requiring lengthy or extensively detailed
records of proceedings or opinions by arbitrators would destroy sev-
eral of the atiractive purported advantages of arbitration - infor-
mality, speed and relatively low costs. Requiring lengthy and exten-
sive records or opinions would burden arbitration with the
characteristics that make litigation difficult. Conceivably, proceed-
ings might become more formal so that detailed records could be
kept, and arbitration costs might increase since lengthy and detailed
records and opinions are expensive to maintain and prepare. Eventu-
ally the maintenance and preparation of records and the ultimate
drafting of extensive opinions would inflict upon arbitration proceed-
ings the same delays and inordinate time expenditures peculiar to
traditional litigation. To remove the informality, relative inexpense,
and speed from arbitration proceedings would be to transform arbi-
tration into litigation. The use of short, concise, but relatively thor-
ough opinions and records, however, would avoid such an unfortu-
nate transformation.
Records and opinions must be short and concise to quell concerns
that arbitration efficiency will diminish if such devices are required.
For example, in areas outside the securities field, arbitrators main-
tain records or deliver opinions. Labor arbitrators, for example, rou-
tinely deliver opinions with their awards154 with no apparent loss of
efficiency. The labor field, like the securities field, is complex. If la-
bor arbitrators are able to resolve disputes, maintain records and de-
liver opinions without great efficiency loss, securities arbitrators can
and must do the same. Moreover, any perceivable reduction 1 15 in ef-
ficiency is justified to protect investors and ensure arbitrator compli-
ance with the law.156
Balancing the competing policies of protecting investors while en-
couraging arbitration continues to plague the Supreme Court. The
issue of the arbitrability of section 10(b) actions under the 1934 Act
remains undetermined, the Court having twice declined to address
this issue. In October 1986, however, the Court, in an effort to re-
solve this nagging problem, granted review of a Second Circuit deci-
sion, McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.157
In McMahon, plaintiffs charged defendant Shearson with know-
ingly violating section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 by churning plaintiffs'
accounts, making false statements, and omitting material facts.158
154. Stephens, Why Courts Overrule Arbitrators' Awards, 36 LAB. L.J. 108, 109
(1985).
155. See Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1215 (2d Cir. 1974).
156. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
157. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
158. Id. at 95. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged violations of the Racketeer Influ-
enced Corruption Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). Id.
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Shearson moved to compel arbitration under a clause in the parties'
investment contracts. The district court granted the motion and or-
dered the federal securities law claims arbitrated. 159 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under Wilko and
Second Circuit precedent, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims were
not arbitrable °60 The stage, therefore, is set for the Court to deliver
a landmark decision which hopefully will recognize arbitration as the
favored alternative.
CONCLUSION
The use of arbitration to resolve investor-broker disputes in the
securities industry has increased dramatically. Pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses are standard features in investment contracts. Though
the Federal Act mandates the enforcement of valid arbitration
agreements, many courts have refused to enforce investment contract
arbitration clauses, fearing that arbitration does not afford investors
the extensive protection provided by the securities laws.
In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court created an exception to the
Federal Act by holding that securities law claims arising under the
1933 Act are not arbitrable. While several courts have applied the
reasoning of Wilko to the 1934 Act, and thereby have held section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims to be nonarbitrable, others have re-
stricted the application of Wilko to the 1933 Act. The Supreme
Court twice refused to address the issue of the applicability of Wilko
to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions; however, in dicta the Court
noted that application was doubtful due to the differences in provi-
sions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. McMahon v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc. affords the Court an opportunity to resolve this issue.
Arbitration is no longer the "unwelcome stepchild" of the
courts.161 Arbitration offers several advantages over traditional liti-
gation. Moreover, judicial review of awards, though restricted, is be-
coming more frequent due to a willingness by the courts to utilize
statutory provisions. Adequate discovery is possible by drafting dis-
covery provisions into arbitration clauses; requiring arbitrators to
maintain concise but nonextensive records or opinions of their
awards would not burden the arbitration process. 6
2 Because arbitra-
159. Id.
160. Id. at 96.
161. Sterk, supra note 16, at 482.
162. One commentator has called for the establishment of convenient and perma-
nent arbitration forums throughout the country to ensure fairness in accessibility to all
tion can effectively ensure adequate enforcement of the securities
laws, arbitration of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims should be
allowed pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.
AUDREY V. NELSON
parties. Katsoris, supra note 1, at 312. Currently, much of the securities arbitration ap-
parently occurs in New York (the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and
the New York Stock Exchange handle most arbitration proceedings), presenting
problems for out-of-state claimants. See supra note 57.
